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GROVES vs. WRIGHT. 2 Kay & Johns. 347.
Legacy for Z ife-.Farming Stock-Profiis Distingudshable-A farmer
gave his residuary real estate, and his farming stock and implements of
husbandry, and residuary personal estate, to trustees, upon trust to permit
his wife to have the full use, benefit, and enjoyment of the same during
her life, and after her decease to sell the same, and divide the produce
among his children. The widow, after the testator's death, carried on the
'estator's farm, and took additional land, to farm on lease, in the name of
her ,on. It was held by Sir W. Page Wood, '. C., that the lease of the
additional land, and the stock thereon, belongcd to the widoT's estate, and
the stock on the original farm to the estate of her husband. "I cannot,"
said his Honor, "think that the doctrine relating to things qua' l]so usu
consumuntur, can have any application to gift of farming stock. That
doctrine applies to a personal use exhausting the subject of the gift. I
must regard the intention of the testator. Ile says nothing, it is true,
about carrying on the business; but what could the widow have done with
the property so given to her? Could she have sold it? It might have
been sold with her consent; but in that case, surely, the income only of
the proceeds must have been paid to the widow for life. That is, perhaps,
begging the question of the application of the doctrine as to things gume
.),so usu consum untur; but no case has been cited in which the Alhole of
.. : testator's farming stock having been the subject of tile gift, that doctrine
tz been held to apply. When all the wine in a house is given to one for
life, of course the legatee for life may drink it. And there was a ease in
w;hich carriage-horses were held to come within the same rule; but there
the tenant for life had actually used them. Here the farming stock is
given for the benefit of the testator's widow for life. She could not personally use it so as to consume it; the only use she could so plsonally
make of it would be to sell it. By such a bequest, the testator must, I
think, have intended that his widow should have the use of the stock,
contemplating that she would carry on the business of the farm with it.
She might have allowed the stock m. 1, sold, and have taken the income
of the produce for life, leaving t'. ('t ) the legratees in remainder, or
if not, I must suppose that the tei .r ,.n,",mplated that she w.)uld carry
on the business; and if, in the cu.i ., ,,4 -uch business, it was -eessary
that any part of the farming stock should be sold, then the ,:ubtituted
stock would follow the course of the original subject of the bequest.
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FORSHAW VS. HIGGINSON.

20 Beav. 485.

Trustee- PTen and upon what Terms he can Retire from the TrustIn this case the Master of the Rolls has laid down some very useful rules
upon a subject very bare of authority; viz. how far a trustee is justified
in retiring from acting in the trusts.
"A trustee," said his Honor, "cannot from mere caprice retire from
the performance of his trust, without paying the costs occasioned by that
act. Any circumstances, however, arising in the administration of the
trust, which have altered the nature of his duties, justify him in leaving
it, and entitle him to receive his costs; but to justify him in that course,
the circumstances must be such as arise out of the administration of the
trust, and not those relating to himself individually."
A trustee desirous of retiring from the trust, on the ground of want of
confidence in his co-trustee, cannot properly get rid 6f the trust by procuring the co-trustee, in whom he felt no'confidence, to appoint in his place
another person, not only not sanctioned, but opposed and objected to by
the cestui, gue -trust; "for although," said his Honor, "I do not say he
would have been liable for any misconduct that might afterwards have
been committed by the trustees, yet the court would certainly have greatly
disapproved of such a proceeding, and he would have rendered himself
liable to great risks, such as no trustee should be called upon to incur."
In Forshaw vs. Bigginson, a trustee, for reasons of a private nature not
arising out of the trusts, not feeling confidence in his co-trustee, was
desirous of retiring from the trusts. The cestui que trust refused to give
him a release. It was held by Sir J. Romilly, AI. R., that he was justified
in instituting a suit asking to be discharged from the trusts, and offering
to account, inasmuch, as although he was desirous of retiring, from private
circumstances, he would not have been justified in simply retiring and
getting his co-trustee, in whom he had no confidence, to appoint a new
trustee. The trustee was also allowed his costs. His Honor, however,
said, as in this case the desire of the trustee to retire arose out of private
circumstances, and not out of the administration of the trust, that if on the
application of the trustee to be discharged, his cestui gue trust had said,
you must pay the costs of the appointment of the new trustees, which
would have been the mere costs of an endorsement on a deed, and had he
refused to do that, he should not have supported the plaintiff in instituting
a suit, by giving him the costs thereby occasioned.
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REG. vs. LEaGATT.

18

Q. B. ".I

.abeas Corpus by Husband to regain Cusfo.i , --.
/ lfe-This was a
rule calling on Mr. Lcggatt., at the instance of " Sandilands, to show
cause why a habeas corpus should not issue t,bring up the body of the
applicant's wife, who was not on good temo., with the applicant, and
voluntarily resided with 3Mr. Lcggatt, her son. On cause being shown,
the Conrt of Queen's Bench discharged the rule, holding that where a wife
is, by her own desire, living apart from her husband, and is under no
restraint, the court will not grant a habeas corpus on the application of
the husband, for the purpose of restoring her to his custody.-(See Re
Coehrane, 8 Dowl. 630; and Rex vs. .Mead, 1 Burr. 542.)
BARKER vs. TnE MIDLAND RAILWAY COMIPANY.

18

Com. B. 46.

Railway compaa1 1-Mi
t of, to exclude TJehiles from their Station"
yard-This was an action by the plaintiff, an omnibus proprietor, who
carried passengers and their luggage for hire to and from a railway-station
of the defendants, for a refusal by the defendant's servant to allow him to
drive his vehicle into the station-yard. There were demurrers and crossdemurrers raised by the pleadings, and the court decided in favor of the
defendants, on the ground that no duty was shown on the defendants' part
to permit the plaintiff to come upon their land.
NEWARK PLANK ROAD vs. ELMER, I Stock.

N. J. Chane. Rep. 754.

Oh.tructionstonavigation und, rautwrityofcrhrter.-Bythe eighth section of the act incorporating the Newark Plank Road and Ferry Company,
they are authorized to construct a plank road, to commence in the city of
Newark, east of Broad street ; and thence passing by the most convenient
and direct course, to the bank of the Passaic river, near the old ferry, and
across the meadow between the Passaic and Iackensack rivers, and through
the county of Hudson in the most eligible route to its point of termination
in said county and opposite the city of New York; and that it shall be
lawful for the said company at any time to drive piles and erect or build
piers, wharves, platforms, ferry stairs, or other works necessary for the
said road and ferrys thereon in the said Passaic and Hackensack rivers ;
provided always that the free and uninterrupted navigation of vessels in
said rivers or either of them, is not thereby prevented by any bridge or
other obstruction in any manner whatever.
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The eleventh section provides that the company shall keep and maintain two good and sufficient ferry boats at the respective ferries on each
of the said rivers and. shall cause lamps to be put up at the extreme
point of each pier at said ferries which shall be lighted before dark every
evening, and kept lighted until daylight next morning. After the company had driven piles and indicated the distance to which they intended
to project piers into the river, a bill was filed praying an injunction restraining the said company from projecting piers, &c. into the Passaic
river, and from obstructing the free navigation of said river.
Held, that the act gives the company the right to extend their works
beyond the banks of the river; that the language of the proviso assumes
that the works authorized.will be an obstruction to the river, but provides
that no such obstruction shall be built or-erected as would prevent the free
and uninterrupted navigation of vessels in the river.
As the plan of the company mentioned in the bill and answer, and
upon which they were proceeding to construct their works itand over the
river, extended into the river to the obstruction of navigation beyond what
was necessary for the purposes of, and contemplated by the act of incorporation, an" injunction was allowed, restraining the defendants from constructing their works upon that pln. _
Held, That if the contemplated plan would occasion an obstruction to
the navigation of the river beyond what the charter authorized, the works
would be a nuisance.
Every erection in a navigable river which detracts or hinders the navigation, is a nuisance.
It is well settled that granms of this nature are to be construed strictly,
and not extended beyond what is reasonably necessary for the purpose the
act contemplates.
The issue made is that the piers were proposed to be built as the charter authorized, and would not prevent the free and uninterrupted navigation to any greater extent than was intended by it. The question is as to
the meaning of the charter. It is too plain to admit of a reasonable doubt
that, independent of the charter, they would constitute a nuisance.

-.

K

vs. JoHNsoN, I Stock. N. J. Ch.Rep., 401

Aulfority of a majority of tw stockhlders n a -coryoration to varj tieir

buiness.-When a board of directors or a majority of stockholders deviate
from the originally contemplated undertaking, the "rights" of other and dissenting stockholders are "affected," and as against them they cannot legally
do it.
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A majority of stockholders in a prosperous corporation cannot at their
own mere caprice, sell out the whole source of their emoluments and invest their capital in other enterprises where the minority desire the proseeution of the business in which they had engaged. The contract is, that
their joint funds shall, under the care of specified persons, generally called
directors, be employed, and that for certain specified purposes.
Where the duration of such employment is limited in the charter, until
that time it must continue so employed, unless perhaps in case of clear
loss. If no time is fixed by the charter, at which the proposed use of the
capital shall cease, the contract is, that so long as the affairs of the company are prosperous it shall go on, unless all consent to the contrary.
How far, under what circumstances, and upon what application a court
of equity would restrain a corporation from an improper alienation of its
property, must depend upon the general principles which guide it in the
exercise of its powers; but in a proper case made, it would interfere to
prevent a disposition of its property for other than corporate purposes.
"It is the right of a partner to hold his associates to the specified purposes whilst the partnership continues."
In the enacting section of the charter of a railroad, the words "and
they and their successors by the said name and style shall be capable of
purchasing, holding, and conveying, any lands, tenements, goods and chattels whatever necessary and expedient to the objects of this incorporation,
9nly .uthorize property to be sold and conveyed away, when it is necesL9rv or cxpedient to the objects of the incorporation. The objects of the
incorporation cannot require that the necessary source of its profitable existence should be sold and conveyed away.
A supplement to the act of incorporation of a railroad company authorizing the company to purchase the road constructed by another company,
and declaring that the purchased road should become a part of the road
authorized to be constructed by the. charter, contained a proviso: That
nothing in this act contained, shall in anywise affect any right whatever,
cither at law or in equity of any stockholder or other person in, or any
taihn or demand against the company whose road it was contemplated to
purchase. Held, that the puiL,.se authorized by the supplement did affect the rights of the stochold,.r. in the company whose road was to be
purehased. And that the 1-.gislaitre intended when they provided that
nothing in that act contairncd sh.jnld in anywise affet any right whatever,
that such purchase should not occur without that whitch alone could prevent its affecting such rights, viz: the consent of every stoekhl lr.

RECENT ADJUDGED POINTS.

Quere. Whether a supplement authorizing any deviation from the
original charter and not requiring the consent of all the stockholders is
unconstitutional.
Where the company whose road was purchased under the above supplement and who were not a necessary party to any of the different kinds of
relief prayed, had not been made a party to a bill filed by one who was a
protesting stockholder, against the directors of both roads and the company in possession of the road, and all its property but the franchise; and
the objection was not taken until the hearing of a general demurrer to the
equity of the bill; the court disposed of the case on its merits without
requiring such formal parties to be joined.
1 Stock. N. J. Chauc. Rep. 624.'
Inju-nction-irrparablemischief.-The object of a preliminary injunction is to prevent some threatening irreparable mischief, which should be
averted until opportunity is afforded for a full and deliberate investigation
of the case.
Where it does not appear that irreparable mischief is liable to ensue
from leaving a party to go on exercising a right he claims, the court
never stops him before it has an opportunity of examining the question of
right. The mere erection of a house, intended as a poor and work-house,
is in itself no injury to anybody; nor is the sending of paupers into a
township or county illegally, or keeping them there a few months, a case
of irreparable mischief.
Where at the time a preliminary injunction was applied for, the main
question in the cause, which was essentially a question of law, was pending
before a court of-law, the application was refused. The rule has been long
established that, in such cases, a court of equity does not interfere by
injunction until the question of right is determined.
ATTORNEY GENERAL vs. PATTERSON,

J. Ohana. Rep. 635.
Rigit to surveyed route by/railroadcompany.-Two railroad companies
were incorporated to complete two independent lines across the State. No
route was prescribed to either other than the termini. There was no conflict of routes on the face of the charters, and no necessary conflict in carrying out the objects of the charters.
Held, that the prior right attached to the company which first actually
surveyed and adopted a route and filed their survey in the office of the
Secretary of State.
MORRIS AND EssEx R. R. vs. BLAm, 1 Stock. N.
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That as no specific r6ute was granted to either company, a right to no
particular place accrued to either until they had selected or determined
upon a location. That no importance should be attached to the fact that
the charter of one company was passed seven days before that of the other.
The mere experimental surveying of a route will not confer any vested
or legal right until it shall have been adopted.
By adopting and filing a survey of their route, a company acquire a
right to obtain the lands over which it passed; and they cannot be deprived of that right by another company purchasing and taking deeds for
those lands, even if made without notice.
Such conveyances could at most put the purchasers in the condition of
land owners, liable to have their lands taken upon making compensation.
DAVIDSON vs. ISHAN, 1 Stock. N. J. Chant. Rep. 186.
.ANuisance in the use of a Steam .Engine.-There may be circumstances
where even the noise of a steam engine may become a private nuisance,
and its use on that account, be restrained by the court. But it would
seem that the use of a steam engine is not prima facie a nuisance on
account of its danger to life from explosion.
The machinery of a mill, which adjoined private dwellings in a densely
populated part of a city, was driven by a steam engine. The complainants alleged that the lives of those residing in the neighborhood were
exposed to the danger of the bursting of the boiler of the steam engine,
that the working of the steam engine and machinery, shook the adjacent
houses, and particularly two of the houses owned by one of the complainants, that the business there carried on caused smoke, steam, vapor, and
unwholesome stenches of a nauseous and disgusting character, rendering
it uncomfortable to dwell in the vicinity. The defendants denied that
their business as carried on was a nuisance, and alleged that the facts upon
which the complainants rely, had been submitted to the proper tribunal
for trying issues of fact, and that the issue had been found in their favor.
Held, that the business being a lawful one, the question of nuisance is
a matter of fact to be determined by the evidence; that upon conflicting
testimony, this court would not interfere where the question of fact had
been previously submitted to a.court of law whose peculiar province it is
to determine questions of law involved in the issue, and to guide and
direct the jury to a proper rcsult. That it is not necessary to constitute
a nuisance, that the smell should be unwholesome, it is enough if it render
the enjoyment of life and property uncomfortable.
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THE MORRIS CANAL Co. vs. FISHER,

1 Stockton's N. J. Chano. Rep. 667.

Title to Coupon Bonds by delivery.-Coupon bonds payable to bearer,
although not negotiable under the law merchant as bills and notes, are
instruments of a peculiar -character, and being expressly designed to be
passed from hand to hand, and by common usage actually so transferred
are capable of passing by delivery so as to confer a complete title in the
possessor. They are the subject of pledge.

Rep. 137. Ext.
Carrir-RailwayCornpany-Packedlparcels-Enclosures-Misdirection-Damagesfor loss of custom.-A declaration by a carrier against a
railway company for not carrying a parcel to Leeds in a, reasonable time,
and for not delivering it, laid, as damages, that the plaintiff was injured in
his trade as a collector of parcels, and lost the custom of several persons.
The plaintiff, a carrier in London, was in the habit of collecting in London
small parcels from different persons to be sent to various persons in the
country.
After collecting them, he used to make them into one parcel, called a
"packed parcel," which he directed to his agent in the country, and
brought to the defendants to be- carried. The plaintiff was also in the
habit of bringing to the defendants for carriage into the country, parcels
containing other small parcels, belonging to one individual in London, and
sent by him to one individual in the country. These parcels were called
C enclosures."
The defendants charged the plaintiff at a higher rate for "packed parcels"
than for "1enclosures," and they also'charged him at a higher rate than
the rest of the phblic. The learned judge stated to the jury that an action
of trover against the defendants could not be brought by each of the owners
of the packages contained in the " packed parcels" in the event of loss or
mis-delivery,- although an action might lie by each owner for the destruction of the packages by the defendants, independently and beyond their
duty as carriers. He also left it to the jury to say whether there was a
difference as regarded the risk between carrying "packed parcels" and
tc enclosures." The jury found that there was no substantial difference as
regarded the risk of carrying the two kinds of parcels; and they found a
verdict for the plaintiff, damages £200, on the ground that the plaintiff
had sustained injury in his trade and loss of custom to that extent, in consequence of the defendants' acts: Held, that the judge rightly directed
CROUCH vs. TqE GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY, 25 L Jour.

